6/18/44: Covering East -Looking West, Cruising Dispositions

18 JUN 44

As Princeton and TG 58.3 steamed west of the Marianas, the ringing of eight bells signaled the Evening Watch giving way to the Midwatch.

While the fleet focused its attention to the anticipated threat approaching from the west, behind it the sun would soon rise over Saipan, where a ground battle continued to rage. Aslito Airfield had been captured and was being quickly repaired by the Seabees. Enemy positions on the southeastern portion of Saipan were being rolled up and pacified in order to allow total focus on Japanese positions to the north.

At sea, 105 nautical miles due west of Saipan, Admiral Spruance had deployed his forces to defend the ground operations to his rear, but ever mindful that he had awesome offensive power at his command.

The War Diary’s initial entry as the calendar turned from 17 to 18 June:

“Steaming as before, in company with Task Group 58.3, west of MARIANAS ISLANDS. Task Group 58.7 stationed on bearing 270˚, distant 15 miles from this task group and Task Group 58.2 on bearing 120˚, distant 12 miles, both conforming to movements of this group. At this time Task Groups 58.1 and 58.4 are en route to join this force after having made air strikes against IWO JIMA and CHICHI JIMA in the BONIN ISLANDS. Zigzagging, Plan 6, on fleet course 315˚, at fleet speed 18 knots, in cruising disposition 5-R, with fleet axis 090˚.”

I have spent the last 18 months trying to find an answer to the specific formations associated with the various “cruising dispositions.” I know they were designed as tactical defenses against the most likely threat to the fleet, e.g. submarine, air, surface, etc.

While surfing around I stumbled upon an Action Report published by Admiral “Jocko” Clark, Commander of Task Group 58.1 and dated 10 February to 4 March 1945 which summarized lessons learned during operations at Iwo Jima. In it is a detailed description of various cruising dispositions and their tactical justifications.

Behold!

Cruising Disposition 5-R, the preferred formation for maximum ability to maneuver in an environment when air attack is not suspected. In this case 5-R was likely utilized due to the negligible threat of Japanese air attack at night.   

Perhaps not a big deal to you, dear reader, but an exciting and pleasant discovery for me!

Local sunrise was at 0556 and at 0529, as the eastern horizon began to define itself, Princeton launched 16 Hellcats for CAP and 8 Avengers for ASP. Reports from far flung submarines continued to be relayed to Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor and then on to Admiral Spruance aboard USS Indianapolis, attached to TG 58.3, and subsequently down the chain of command, eventually manifesting itself in tasking orders to pilots and surface ships.

The Greybook entry for 18 June notes that submarine Cavalla (SS-244), which had been tracking a specific enemy force since the previous day “was in a submerged position under the force at position 12-29 N, 134-30 E (590 mi. W. of GUAM). Course varied between 060 and 100 with speed 19. Formation believed led by CV on starboard flank; 2 units of 3 ships in column were believed to be BB’s* or CA’s or both on port flank; other units astern not identified.”

This intelligence appears to have made it to the commanders on the scene. The War Diary:

“At 0754 sighted a friendly PBM search plane bearing 173˚, distant 5 miles, previously reported approaching by radar. These search planes were flying out of SAIPAN where they had been ordered to search 600 miles to the west for units of the Japanese fleet which had been sighted by submarines and coast watchers leaving the Philippines and heading east.”

Shortly after this entry the War Diary made mention of various destroyers making message runs in and amongst the fleet.

By 1055, Task Groups 58.1 and 58.4 had come into view from the north.  58.1 was ordered to take station “bearing 000˚, distant 12 miles from Task Group 58.3” while 58.4 was positioned the same distance due north of TG 58.7.

Approximately 2 hours after recovering the morning patrols, 12 more Hellcats and 4 Avengers were launched by Princeton at 1149.

“At 1256 an unidentified aircraft was reported bearing 230˚ distant 45 miles and at 1317 USS COWPENS reported her CAP had shot down on Japanese dive bomber, type “JUDY”.

Both sides were desperately trying to pinpoint the others’ location. In response to this snooper, Enterprise and Lexington launched bombers for a 275 mile search to the west.

“At 1615 USS SAN JACINTO CAP reported shooting down one Japanese VF, type “Tony”, bearing 020˚, distant 60 miles from the formation.”

By 1830 the search patrols launched by Enterprise and Lexington had returned:

“Results of the search to the west had been negative and the Task Force was turning back to remain in covering station west of the MARIANAS to intercept attack believed developing by Japanese surface forces.”   

The Sailors of Task Force 58 knew a showdown was brewing, but few knew that the battle ahead, technically known as The Battle of the Philippine Sea, would go down as one of the greatest battles ever fought at sea.

The Aviators of the fifteen American aircraft carriers would cover themselves in glory over the next two days, devastating the enemy and piercing the outer defense barrier of the Japanese Empire once and for all.

Their dominance would also be cause for an appropriately descriptive renaming of the battle, as we shall see.

* BB = Battleship, CA - Cruiser, CV = Aircraft Carrier

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