6/17/44: Searching for the Enemy

17 JUN 44

Reflecting his concern over a gathering Japanese threat to the fleet, Admiral Spruance would not hesitate to utilize a relatively new capability to locate this threat.

Both USS Bunker Hill and USS Wasp were Essex class carriers that formed the nucleus of Task Group 58.2 and each included 4 F6F(N) night fighter aircraft and pilots trained to fly them.

At 0200 TG 58.2, operating 15 miles to Princeton’s southwest, “commenced launching aircraft for 275 mile search to the west for Japanese surface units believed approaching in reaction to landings on SAIPAN ISLAND.”

At 0334, in response to a perceived surface threat on a bearing of 230˚ and only 6 miles distant, Princeton and TG 58.3 executed an emergency turn right to course 290˚ in order to bring all ship’s guns to bear. Destroyer USS Cotten (DD-669) was dispatched to investigate and reported contact as a Japanese sampan and proceeded to fire on it, leaving it sinking before rejoining the formation by 0407.

With local sunrise occurring at 0600, over the course of the next two hours, multiple surface contacts were observed on radar and designated as potentially hostile forces, necessitating a near constant series of emergency turns by the Task Group. Several Japanese sampans, known to be used as snoopers and communications platforms, were investigated and fired upon.

The approaching dawn revealed a chaotic swirl of gray ships, their white wakes leaving truncated trails on the dark, rolling surface. This scene contrasted with a sky of light blue, upon which dozens of ink-dark crosses circled, anchored overhead the vast fleet before passing from sight towards the western horizon in search of the enemy.

For the next several hours each of the carriers would, at intervals, launch aircraft. At 0906 Princeton contributed 8 Hellcats to patrol the skies overhead the fleet and 4 Avengers to search for enemy naval forces. On the surface there was further evidence that something significant was brewing. Destroyer USS Cogswell (DD-651) was delivering messages to Enterprise and henceforth from that ship to various ships in TG 58.3. Simultaneously USS Marshall (DD-676) from TG 58.2 visited USS Lexington with message traffic. 

“At 1255 an unidentified aircraft was reported bearing 287˚, distant 64 miles; this was identified as a Japanese dive bomber, type JUDY and destroyed by the CAP from USS ENTERPRISE.”

At 1320, an hour after recovering her first patrols, Princeton received orders from ComTaskForce 58 to conduct air strikes and "this vessel launched 7 VT and 8 VF to join strike against GUAM and ROTA Islands.” 14 of these aircraft dropped bombs on fishing boats, an inter-island steamer and various small buildings in and near Sosanjaya (Sasanhaya) Bay on the southwestern coast of Rota. Interestingly, a single Hellcat dropped two 100 pound bombs on an anti-aircraft site at the west end of Rota Airfield, 5 miles from where the remaining 14 aircraft attacked, reporting near misses and “no further anti-aircraft fire was seen from that spot.”

An hour after launching the aforementioned strike, Princeton received orders from Admiral Mitscher, ComTaskGroup 58, “to cancel remaining strikes.”

Historical hindsight tells us that American submarines had been tracking the Japanese Mobile Fleet since it had departed Kao Bay/Batjan anchorage in Northern Indonesia and Tawi Tawi in the southeastern Philippines on the 12th and 13th of June respectively. It is undoubtedly the reports from these submarines that were creating the increasing sense of urgency for Fifth Fleet Commander Admiral Spruance and which was filtering down the chain of command to the ships of the Task Groups.

Anyone that reads military history is familiar with instances where seemingly routine or otherwise insignificant decisions are made which, after examination of later events, prove to be gross, often fatal, errors.

Tawi Tawi Anchorage is an example. The Imperial Navy chose Tawi Tawi largely due to its access to the refueling oil fields of Borneo but also because of it’s sheltered and calm waters. Significantly, they chose not to construct more than basic shore facilities or, most importantly, an airfield on the main island from which air patrols could protect anchored and vulnerable Imperial Naval vessels from the snooping eyes of the enemy.

Most World War II-era submariners, while acknowledging the horror of being depth charged by surface vessels, would agree that their most dire threat was discovery and attack from the air. This was largely because being submerged did not necessarily provide the sanctuary one might assume. Multiple factors — sea state, depth, the composition of the ocean bottom, water clarity, salinity — affect the ability of a submarine to disappear under the waves.

The fact that Tawi Tawi had no air surveillance capability meant that American submarines could be relatively unconcerned with detection from the air and were therefore able to monitor and report Japanese fleet movements back to Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor and to Admiral Spruance aboard USS Indianapolis off the Marianas with relative impunity. And this is exactly what happened.

Of the 19 submarines assigned to Operation Forager, 5 had been directed to patrol 500+ miles to the west and southwest of the Marianas in search of the movement of Japanese naval forces expected to oppose the US retaking of the islands. Late on 13 June, as reported in the Greybook, Gato Class submarine Haddo (SS-255) passed the following message: “HADDO reports anchorage at TAWI TAWI completely empty.”

Underway from Tawi Tawi and Kao Bay, the Japanese Mobile Fleet consisted of 9 aircraft carriers, 5 battleships, 11 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 33 destroyers and 24 submarines — 84 combatants in all. The number of Japanese aircraft taking part in the battle was estimated to be in the neighborhood of 400-500. The majority were carrier-based but these were supplemented by aircraft from bases in the Philippines and at Truk, Yap and Palau in the Caroline Islands.

Admiral Spruance and his staff knew this force was coming and because Japanese aircraft had slightly better range than did his own, it was imperative that he find them first.

The cancellation of the remaining strikes were undoubtedly a reaction to the looming threat posed by the Japanese Mobile Fleet. Early in the day, the Greybook noted that Haddo’s sister boat Cavalla (SS-244), periodically rising to periscope depth and maintaining extreme distance to avoid detection, reported “15 or more ships (looked like large combatant ships) position 12-23 N 132-26 E (810 due W of GUAM; 314 miles NNW of BABELTHAUP) zig-zag course estimated 090˚, speed 19.” Testifying to the all-encompassing nature of the effort, the Cavalla sighting was confirmed by “Reports from the PHILIPPINES coast watchers substantiate submarine sightings previously reported.”

At 1622, thirty minutes prior to recovering the strike that had launched at 1400, Admiral Mitscher “advised all ships by TBS that indications revealed that an air attack by shore based enemy aircraft was developing.”

This communication set into motion a frenzied sequence of maneuvers to prepare the Task Force and Task Groups for the expected attack:

“At 1640 CruDiv TWELVE was ordered to take station bearing 270°, distant 15 miles from this task group. At 1650 fleet course changed right to 270˚ and at 1655 fleet speed changed to 20 knots. At 1658 ComTaskForce 58 ordered CruDiv TWELVE to join this formation and at 1659 DesDiv NINETY was ordered to join CruDiv TWELVE. At 1702 DesDivs 12, 89, and 106 were directed to take station ahead of this task group in order to form screen for the battleships which were ordered to prepare to leave the formation. At 1710 fleet speed changed to 18 knots. At 1715 USS WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, ALABAMA, and INDIANA increased speed to 25 knots and left the formation to form Task Group 58.7 when joined with USS NEW JERSEY and IOWA and Cru-Div SIX. Fleet speed changed to 15 knots while battleships cleared the formation. At 1740 formation axis was rotated left to 090°.”

“At 1755 a large group of unidentified aircraft were reported bearing 160˚, distant 112 miles.”

“At 1810 a large group of unidentified aircraft reported bearing 135˚, distant 102 miles.

“At 1813 Task Force 52 was reported under attack by enemy aircraft in the vicinity of SAIPAN ISLAND.”

“At 1822 USS STEPHEN POTTER in Task Group 58.2 reported sound contact.”

For the next thirty minutes, as both surface and air contact reports streamed in, the fleet made almost continuous course and speed changes while deploying the destroyers and cruisers to defend the carriers.

Local sunset was at 1852 and one minute later “unidentified aircraft now reported bearing 115˚, distant 66 miles.

“At 1855 went to General Quarters.”

18 minutes after setting GQ “unidentified aircraft now believed to be be returning to GUAM or YAP after having delivered attack against Task Force 52 in vicinity of SAIPAN ISLAND.”

With the exception of a single unidentified aircraft being reported 30 miles south at 2053, the situation stabilized and by 2120 “all unidentified aircraft disappeared from radar screens.”

As the fleet settled into the uniquely profound darkness of a night at sea, Task Group 58.3 continued maneuvering west of the Marianas, continuing to prepare aircraft for the battle that all knew was imminent.

NNNN