15 JUN 44
D-Day for OPERATION FORAGER, the invasion of Saipan by the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions, would begin shortly after dawn on the morning of 15 June with coordinated strikes delivered by naval surface and air power. While the Navy had been striking Saipan intermittently since February in anticipation of this battle, these efforts had steadily increased in intensity as the invasion neared in the hope that Japanese resistance would be diminished accordingly when the time came. If successful, the capture and occupation of Saipan and adjacent islands of the Marianas chain would provide bases from which American B-29 bombers could, at long last, bring the war directly to the Japanese homeland.
At 0454, an hour prior to local sunrise, the fleet turned south into the wind and within minutes Princeton had launched “8 VT and 16 VF for Strike ABLE in support of amphibious landings on SAIPAN ISLAND by Task Force 51.”
This mission would be part of the pre-invasion effort to soften enemy defenses prior to the Marines coming ashore at 0815. Both VF and VT-27 were tasked with strafing and bombing the western beaches of southern Saipan. The Air Group’s Action Report describes the initial strike:
“Sixteen F6Fs strafed the beach from Garapan town to Charan-Kanoa town prior to the landings by the Marine Expeditionary forces. Targets were the towns themselves and positions along the beach front. … Eight TBM-1C bombed and strafed gun installations emplaced in a vertical cliff about 200 feet high. One pilot made what constituted a low level attack, others made combination glide-low-level attacks.”
Charan Kanoa as seen from the air. USMC photo. https://1-24thmarines.com/the-battles/saipan/dday/
Interestingly, “At 0910 ComTaskGroup 58.3 ordered all battleships to take station on circle 3.5.*” There is no further explanation for this order but, knowing what is about to happen from our vantage point 80 years hence, it indicates to me that Task Force leadership had passed intelligence to the Task Group commanders indicating the increased potential of an enemy air attack.
At 0912 the final plane from Strike DOG, Princeton’s second launch, left her deck, again consisting of 16 fighters and 8 bombers. By this time the amphibious landings had been underway for an hour and the P’s aircraft would be directed to targets by the CSA, or “Commander Support Aircraft,” a senior aviator who would direct attacks while loitering over the target area observing both friendly and enemy positions and movements.
“Sixteen F6Fs were directed…to attack enemy tanks moving south from Garapan toward Charan-Kanoa. Many hits were observed among the tanks which took to cover along the road side and remained immobile as long as the planes were able to observe. …Three TBM-1C made glide-bombing attacks on two Jap tanks.”
Strike HOW, Princeton’s final of the day, launched at 1330 and, unlike the previous missions which focused on the invasion beaches, this mission would hit gun positions at Cape Obiam and Nafutan Point on Saipan’s southern coast as directed by the CSA.
In the world of air-to-ground attack — before the advent of GPS-guided weapons changed everything — there was a fundamental truth with respect to the quest for bombing accuracy and its inverse relationship to the safety of the pilot doing the bombing. Generally speaking, the less time a bomb is in the air, the smaller the magnitude of any pilot-induced angle or deflection errors by the time it hits the ground. (Roughly speaking, the 60:1 rule tells us that a bomb dropped 6000’ from its target with a 1˚ deflection error will miss by 100’. From 3000’ it will miss by 45’. From 2000’ the error is 30’. And so on.) Among the multitudes of other potential errors associated with our three dimensional world, the less time a bomb is travelling downrange, the less time it is being affected by external elements such as wind and weather. Further, accuracy is usually enhanced the closer/lower to the target simply because this allows the pilot a better opportunity to visually acquire said target and fine tune the aimpoint (speed, dive angle, wings level). This perhaps too clinical discussion leaves out one very important factor:
The closer you are to the gun you are trying to destroy, the closer you are to the gun that is trying to destroy you.
Hence, the inversely proportional relationship between bombing accuracy and the safety of the man in the machine. Put in different terms, there is a directly proportional relationship between courage and accuracy, as demonstrated in the final recommendation from the Action Report summary of the day’s action:
“It is suggested by Lt.Cdr. Haley, Commanding Officer of VT-27, that a conventional glide bombing attack against pin-point targets in support operations is not practicable with considerable cloud cover at 2,000 feet and the targets further obscured by smoke from previous attacks. It is recommended that bombs carry delayed action fuses to permit low level bombing, in order that gun installations, tanks, and other small targets be more readily spotted and consequently more effectively bombed.”
All aircraft from Strike HOW recovered shortly before 1700 but, as we shall see, Princeton’s participation in the day’s hostilities were far from over.
While Princeton’s crew began preparing the ship and Air Group for the next day’s schedule, other TG 58.3 carriers were tasked with providing the late afternoon and early evening Combat Air Patrol over the fleet. “At 1805 an unidentified aircraft was reported bearing 142˚, distant 42 miles, at an altitude of 20,000 feet, on course 080˚, speed 270 knots.**” This aircraft, which turned out to be an enemy Ki-61 “Tony” fighter, was intercepted and shot down at 1816. Significantly, the War Diary notes that “at 1818 received information by TBS from ComTaskForce 58 in USS LEXINGTON that the Japanese plane had ordered an attack on the force before being shot down.”
The chaos of the next several hours would prove this intercepted transmission to be accurate. Reading through the War Diary I quickly realized that trying to summarize the situation would be difficult and likely not provide an appreciation for the frenzied nature of the action. I would ask you to imagine you are Princeton’s FDO (Fighter Direction Officer) looking intently at returns on your radar scope while simultaneously listening to transmissions on multiple radios from other Task Force and Task Group ships, in addition to your primary duty of communicating with multiple pilots and groups of aircraft. Also, if my experience is any guide, on occasion being interrupted by phone calls from the Captain or his representatives.
Mark 1 Mod 1 plotting tables in the fighter direction area of the light carrier Santee’s Carrier Intelligence Center (CIC). This Bureau of Ships new standard plotting table was introduced in the Essex Class carriers and was also available for backfit in existing ship’s. Its design was in response to inputs from experienced fighter director officers. It was intended for use by one FDO and two plotting assistants, and could accommodate three attached folding stools. Each working position had selectable communication circuits to twenty other stations, and its plotting surface could be directly written on with ordinary lead pencils. Own ships heading was projected onto the plotting surface. National Archives photo 80-G-342577
With this in mind, behold the War Diary description of events:
1819: unidentified group of aircraft reported bearing 190˚, 52 miles
1825: Princeton sets General Quarters, ordered by TG Commander to “scramble” ready fighters
1826: “…sighted a single low-flying, unidentified aircraft, disappearing below the horizon, bearing 130˚…”
1828: “…unidentified aircraft, designated Raid II, were reported bearing 175˚, distant 37 miles.”
1831: ComTaskGroup 58.3 cancelled order to launch fighters and “at 1837 USS ENTERPRISE launched two VF(N).”
1841: “…the CAP from USS SAN JACINTO reported shooting down three Japanese VF aircraft, seen to be carrying small bombs, and reported that three others had escaped into the clouds; another aircraft, possibly friendly, had been seen to explode.”
1847: “…unidentified aircraft were reported bearing 100˚, distant 21 miles.”
1851: “Task Group 58.2 was reported to be under attack, enemy aircraft bearing 050˚, distant 15 miles from that formation.”
1852: Local sunset
1853: “unidentified aircraft reported bearing 150˚, distant 20 miles.”
1854: “unidentified aircraft reported bearing 060˚, distant 32 miles.”
1858: “unidentified aircraft, designated Raid IV, reported bearing 070˚, distant 15 miles.”
1859: Battleship “USS NORTH CAROLINA opened fire on enemy aircraft bearing 050˚, altitude about 4,000 feet- - a single plane.”
1900: “…firing ceased.”
1901: “…a group of 10 or 12 unidentified aircraft, designated Raid V, were reported bearing 205˚, distant 25 miles, closing.”
1902: “…various ships on port side fired again at the single plane.”
1903: “Raid V was reported bearing 090˚, distant 20 miles, closing.”
1904: “At 1904 USS NORTH CAROLINA firing to port, and at 1905 USS ENTERPRISE opened fire to port.”
1906: “…firing ceased. Raid V now reported bearing 165˚, distant 11 miles.”
1907: “…sighted seven unidentified aircraft just above the horizon dead ahead of the formation, crossing to port, and closing. Various ships opened fire.”
It should be evident after reading the above log entries that the situation was turning increasingly chaotic. Whether or not the Japanese intended to time their attacks as daylight faded, there is no doubting that the looming darkness exacerbated the confusion.
“At 1909 formation executed emergency turn left 60˚ to course 090˚. Enemy aircraft commenced attacking from several directions simultaneously; all ships firing. By 1910 all of the attacking aircraft had been shot down by ship’s anti-aircraft fire; six were seen to burst into flames and burn on the water and the seventh skidded into the water and crashed without burning. … No ships were damaged by the enemy, but several ships were hit by the anti-aircraft fire of other ships in the formation.”
Unfortunately Princeton was one of the ships the receiving end, proving once again that “friendly fire” isn’t always:
“This vessel was hit on the port side forward by 40 mm. fire from screening battleships, at least five shells hitting forward of frame 12, one penetrating the skin of the ship below the water line and flooding the two forward peak tanks and the forward fresh water pump room. Five officers and six enlisted men*** were injured, two of them critically, by shrapnel.”
This blueprint is of USS Monterey (CVL-26), one of Princeton’s sister Independence Class light carriers. I have done my best, using both the War Diary and the War Damage Report to pinpoint the hits and the damage. Dad's GQ station was in the Medical Department spaces, located from frame 30 to approximately frame 50, about 12 frames away from the nearest 40mm shell hit. I assume he heard the impacts and I think it likely that he lent a hand in treating the wounded.
40mm Bofors anti-aircraft round.
The War Damage Report submitted by the Commanding Officer to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships provides specific details of the damage sustained during the multi-axis enemy air attack:
“On the night of 15 June, 1944, the formation in which this ship was steaming underwent an attack by enemy torpedo planes. During this action this ship received five 40mm projectile hits from another ship in the formation on the port side. These hits are believed to have come from a battleship in the screen … and ranged vertically from the gallery walkway to the waterline … One projectile penetrated the hull five feet below the third deck level, probably when this area was above the waterline as the ship pitched.”
While damage control crews and medical personnel responded below decks, the action continued on the surface and in the air.
1913: “…formation executed emergency turn 40˚ right to course 130˚”
1917: “…screening vessels opened fire on unidentified aircraft ahead of formation, designated Raid VI, closing.”
1918: “…unidentified aircraft reported bearing 180˚, distant 20 miles.”
In the midst of all this action, with unidentified and likely enemy aircraft reported in an amongst the formation continuously…
1921: “At 1921 USS SAN JACINTO turned on red truck light and prepared to recover one division of CAP still airborne, which had been orbiting 1 to 15 miles south of the formation, and which were now low on gasoline. Recovery completed at 1932.”
1931: “…unidentifed aircraft of Raid VI reported bearing 145˚, distant 37 miles.”
1936: “…fleet course changed right to 220˚”
1941: “…fleet course changed right to 310˚”
1942: “…unidentified aircraft reported bearing 330˚ 5 miles.”
1945: “…observed loom of a light, apparently from fires on ROTA ISLAND, bearing 165˚, and on TINIAN ISLAND, bearing 060˚, both over the horizon.”
1946: “At 1946 new raid designations commenced; Raid I now reported bearing 286˚, distant 26 miles.”
1949: “…observed flares dropping and anti-aircraft fire bearing 040˚, distant 15-20 miles, in the general location of Task Group 58.2.”
1953: “Raid I reported bearing 285˚, distant 24 miles.
1954: “…more flares over the horizon.”
1955: “Task Group 58.2 was under attack and firing.”
1956: “Raid I reported bearing 290˚, distant 18 miles, closing, at an altitude of 500 to 1000 feet.”
1958: “Raid I was reported bearing 306˚, distant 12 miles.”
1959: Raid I “320˚, 10 miles.”
2000: “Unidentified aircraft were also reported dead astern, distant 8 miles, and bearing 145˚, distant 14 miles. … formation executed emergency turn 20˚ right to course 330˚.”
2001: “Raid I reported bearing 350˚, 10 miles.”
2005: “Fleet course changed left to 310˚”
2006: “Raid I reported bearing 010˚, distant 18 miles.”
2007: “…observed gunfire on horizon, bearing 040˚"
2010: “…USS NORTH CAROLINA reported flashing light in water 2000 yards off port bow.”
2012: “Raid I reported bearing 355˚, distant 11 miles, closing.”
2013: “…formation executed emergency turn 90˚ left to course 220˚.”
2014: “Raid III reported bearing 302˚, distant 20 miles and Raid I bearing 320˚, 10 miles.”
2015: “USS LEXINGTON reported that a gyro compass error in all radar bearings resulting in fact that all reports on Raid I were in reality friendly VF(N).”
2016: “Raid III reported bearing 290˚, distant 16 miles.”
2017: “Raid III reported bearing 296˚, distant 13 miles.”
For over three hours the radar plot had been a kaleidoscopic display of now-you-see-them-now-you-don’t blips and luminescent traces — most actual, some imaginary and a few reported in positions where they were not.
The SAN JACINTO CAP had shot down 4 enemy aircraft while the ships of the Task Group had splashed 7, and by 2031 Princeton’s log entry reported “no enemy aircraft remained on radar screens.” At 2107, 2 hours and 42 minutes after setting it, Princeton secured from General Quarters.
While the Marines ashore had experienced unexpectedly fierce Japanese resistance necessitating the addition of reserves provided by the 27th Division of the US Army, Princeton's crew would work through the night to repair damage and ready aircraft in anticipation of more of the same tomorrow. This assessment would prove accurate.
NNNN
* I presume this is an order for the battleships to station themselves on a 3 1/2 mile ring around Task Group 58.3. U.S. Navy doctrine at this time dictated circular formations as a protective measure against both surface but particularly air attack. Lighter ships such as destroyers and light cruisers would form the outermost ring and larger ships with more robust anti-aircraft capability would be positioned on the inner rings closer to the carriers they were charged with protecting.
** After 2 1/2 years of war, as evidenced by the specific detail included in this report, radar equipment, coupled with crew training and experience had improved significantly.
*** The “Casualties in Action” report submitted by the Medical Officer lists 8 enlisted personnel as wounded and two of these as “Serious.” One with a shrapnel wound in the abdomen, the other a hand. All remaining enlisted and officers have prognoses listed as “Favorable.”
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