By the time the last night fighters were recovered by Enterprise, Task Force 58 — the Fast Carrier Task Force which would become known to history as "the Fast Carriers" — was forming up to retire once again to Majuro Atoll in the Marshall Islands, presumably for provisioning and maintenance.
The Action Report submitted by the Air Group Commander on the 29 April to 1 May strikes against Truk highlighted the consistent problem of undisciplined radio communications in the air. After the New Guinea strikes CAG Miller had commented that "Pilots should think before they talk, and no pilot should be allowed to take off until he knows the [standard] hand signals." He added that "Use of nicknames is so entirely confusing to all planes in the air, that any pilot using same should be grounded."
I find these comments, which have been repeated almost verbatim in the Action Report after every combat operation, interesting for a couple reasons. LtCdr Miller wears "two hats": he is the Commanding Officer of VF-23, the fighter squadron, but also the Commander of the Air Group. As such he is ultimately responsible for the performance of both of Princeton's squadrons. With this in mind, I assume that his remarks are not aimed at his own command, but rather at the behavior of squadrons flying off other carriers in the Task Force. Considering that all units eventually see the Action Reports, I imagine some of the chit chat and body language during Commander's Conferences held prior to combat ops might have been interesting to witness.
I must say, based on my own experience, I sympathize with CAG. Disciplined communications may very well be, with the exception of a plan that is well-briefed and understood by every participant, the second most important factor in mission success. I would much rather fly on an imperfect plan that is briefed well and understood by all, than a perfect plan poorly briefed. The former has a much better chance of being "shit hot" while the latter, more often than not, becomes a complete "goatf**k."
And yes, goatf**k is one word.
CAG Miller, who had trained the Doolittle Raiders to launch from Hornet and who had been with Princeton since her commissioning, including all of Princeton's combat through 1943 and up to the present, also addressed the tactics used by all groups in the Task Force:
On the second day, all Air Groups were sent against Dublon Island. Planes were shot down on almost every strike, because Groups came in from the same direction, made the same approach, and the same kind of attack. This was partially due to the low ceiling, congestion of Groups at the target, not knocking out the anti-aircraft guns, and the slow speed approach used by some groups. It has been demonstrated time and time again that if the VB [note: Bombers] and VF are assigned to dive-bomb and strafe anti-aircraft positions until they are knocked out, maximum damage will be done at the target by all strikes. If one Group follows another closely, and there is no VF opposition, it should wait until the target is clear, and come in from different directions.
It is probably worth noting that none of Princeton's aircraft were shot down, and only two, both Avengers, were slightly damaged by AA fire, during the 3 days of operations at Truk.
The opening paragraph of the May War Diary details the composition of Task Group 58.3 as 5 Carriers, 5 Battleships, 3 Heavy Cruisers and 17 Destroyers. Including Task Groups 58.1 and 58.2 the fleet numbered approximately 90 vessels, and Princeton's entry notes that "there has been no damage suffered by any ship in this force as a result of enemy air attacks."
I hope Captain Buracker, considering the previous afternoon's brush with near disaster, had a moment of appreciation for the poor bombing skills of the enemy and an appreciative nod to the ancient goddess Tyche when he signed off on that particular sentence.
1 MAY 44
Through the hours immediately after midnight the Task Force thrummed southeasterly toward the Marshall Islands, leaving Truk Atoll and the Caroline Islands in its wake.
"Task Force 58 is in fleet cruising disposition 5W [on fleet course 140˚] with fleet axis 330˚, so that Task Groups 58.2 and 58.1 are both bearing 150˚, distant 8 and 16 miles respectively from this Task Group; Task Group 58.2 is guide unit."
I have tried for all these months, vainly as it turns out, to find a document which explains what the cruising disposition codes, "5W" in this case, mean specifically. As frustrating as that search has been, I take a measure of pride in the fact that in true and glorious Navy fashion, the decision on how to position his force has been left up to the local commander. The guidance from above, in this case the Commander-In-Chief of the US Fleet's War Instructions, United States Navy 1944 is appropriately general:
600. Cruising dispositions are essentially defensive. The fundamental requirements are such as to provide: 1. Protection against surprise in any form. 2. Security for the whole force and the component parts thereof through mutual support.
3. Ready transition to approach, contact or battle disposition. 4. Provisions for rapid and certain transmissions of orders and information.
The War Instruction goes on to describe various types of potential threat against which the local commander should be on guard, but again leaves the decision of specific disposition of forces at the local level:
604. The forms of dispositions selected normally fall into the following categories:
1. Dispositions for entering or leaving port or for passing through restricted waters.
2. Dispositions for repelling attacks by submarines.
3. Dispositions for repelling attacks by aircraft.
4. Dispositions for repelling attacks by light forces.
5. Dispositions for obtaining information of the enemy forces or for denying information to the enemy.
6. Dispositions in readiness for approach, deployment or for maintaining contact.
I was blessed to have worked for a number of remarkable leaders during my time in the Navy. I also witnessed a few who were less than exceptional. After reading through the War Instructions, I have an even better appreciation of the Navy's culture of training people, and letting them get on with things.
If I were asked to give a TED Talk on leadership, based solely on my experience in the world of Naval Aviation, it would be the shortest TED Talk in the history of TED Talks:
- Lead by example
- Trust your people
- Allow mistakes
- Give second chances
- Think long and hard about third chances
- Avoid micromanaging
- Work hard, play hard
As the three Task Groups continued southeast, various carriers shared CAP and ASP duties, Princeton's turn coming with the launch of 8 fighters and 4 bombers at 1304. All were recovered by 1648.
"At 1935 USS CHARLES F. AUSBURNE left formation with orders to investigate a floating belly tank and oil slick reported about 20 miles ahead of the formation by aircraft." In typical and maddening fashion, no further mention of the investigation is made.
At 1936, coincident with local sunset, fleet course was adjusted slightly to 115˚.
2 & 3 MAY 44
The 2nd and 3rd of May were spent methodically consuming nautical miles, all carriers again alternating responsibility for each day's air and surface patrols around the Task Force. With the exception of the destroyer force being refueled to 60% capacity by several battleships and a few select carriers, nothing of note was recorded in the bridge log.
At the close of the day on the 3rd, "Task Groups 58.1 and 58.2 were stationed astern of this Task Group, separation ordered in preparation for entering port the next day."
By 2000 on the evening of the 3rd, Princeton was 160 nautical miles west of Majuro. Tomorrow would be her 4th visit to the atoll in as many months.
4 MAY 44
“At 0620 sighted western islands of MAJURO ATOLL bearing 150˚, distant 14 miles. Local sunrise was at 0621 … At 0720 ComTaskGroup 58.3 ordered Task Group to enter port; carriers formed column in order: USS ENTERPRISE, USS LEXINGTON, USS PRINCETON, USS LANGLEY.”
Majuro Atoll, Marshall Islands, circa May 1944: Sailors swimming at a Majuro recreational area as the fleet waits for the start of the Marianas campaign. USS ENTERPRISE (CV-6) is second carrier from left. Three "Essex" class carriers, two light carriers and a "Brooklyn" class light cruiser are also present. Photographed by USS ESSEX (CV-9).
By 0841 Princeton was, once again, "anchored in Berth 99, Majuro Atoll, MARSHALL ISLANDS."
TG 58.2 was anchored safely in the lagoon by 1020 while TG 58.1 had been sent to Kwajalein for resupply.
Shortly after P's anchor chain had run down the hawsepipe she received the order to be "ready to get underway on 24 hours' notice."
As the sun slipped below the western horizon at 1944, the War Diary's last entry for May 4th read as follows:
"No provisioning was undertaken inasmuch as this vessel had previous orders to proceed from this port to Pearl Harbor, T.H., with expected departure date set for 6 May 1944."
5 MAY 1944
At 0030 hours personnel began what would be an almost 14 hour effort to unload ordnance for transfer to other vessels in TG 58.3. The accounting of every item transferred takes up approximately 3/4 of the War Diary entry for this day. Seemingly every bomb, tail vane, primer, detonator and fuze was offloaded.
Impressively, it was not just weapons that were removed, but even some of Princeton's weaponry:
"At 1543 removed from foundation and transferred to USS LANGLEY number five 40 mm. gun mount: Mount Mk. 1, Mod. 6; Stand: register No. 197, Mk. 1, Carriage: register No. 1, Mk. 1, Mod. 6; Sight: register No. 197, Mk. 3, Mod. 1; Gun: register No. 15610, Mk. 1."
In the midst of all this activity USS Kennebago (AO-81), having arrived at Majuro from the west coast of the U.S. just two weeks prior, commenced her approach to Princeton's port side to link up for refueling. "...first line passed at 1025; and at 1033, during the approach, the USS KENNEBAGO engaged number two 40 mm. director with her starboard forecastle bulwarks, bending the entire mount upward and aft and placing the director out of bore-sight with numbers 2 and 4 40 mm. mounts."
Tomorrow Princeton would begin the 2000 mile journey to Pearl, where shipyard workers would be waiting, and where significant personnel changes would take place.
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