Maintaining station 50-75 north, Princeton and Air Group 23 pilots prepared for another round of strikes in support of ground troops still fighting to secure Eniwetok and Parry Islands, the last holdouts in the atoll.
The coordination and precision required for this demanding mission was being learned continuously.
In the post-battle Action Report CAG Miller notes the tactical lessons learned:
"Planes first flew low over target area to determine exact location of our ground forces and objectives and then climbed and executed pin-point attacks.
Effective execution depends on (1) a perfectly coordinated attack in regards to timing of the glide bombing and strafing attack and (2) strict radio discipline to insure orders of Commander Support Aircraft being promptly received, understood and complied with.
Thorough briefing is required to insure pilots knowing thoroughly: Location of target areas; distinguishing features of specific (pin-point) targets, times and locations of surface bombardment, targets and schedule of other air attack missions, landing schedule, and most important, the correct communications procedure."
The advent of GPS-guided weapons, which came near the end of my naval career, has made "pin-point" bombing accuracy something at which the pilots of Air Group 23 would marvel. Their ability to achieve meaningful results required much more than just piloting skill. It required thorough and comprehensive map study, an intimate familiarity with one's aircraft, knowledge of the weapons and the cockpit "switchology" required to deliver them, proper dive angles and airspeeds, complete understanding of communications procedure, and dozens of other details — all of which would combine to achieve any aviator's, especially a combat aviator's, ultimate goal: the highest Situational Awareness possible.
Task Group Intelligence Sections used aerial photographs to create targeting maps, gridded and numbered in order to allow aircrews to determine where, and more importantly where not, to attack.
For example, the Action Report notes that on yesterday's pre-amphibious landing strike the Air Coordinator directed that the five Avengers of Princeton's bombing squadron deliver their 2000-pound bombs "in areas 519, 520, 524, and 526, ... adjacent to the landing beach" in advance of the landing craft that were inbound from the lagoon side of the atoll.
The grid map, a copy of which each pilot would have in his cockpit, also provided the Air Coordinator the ability to change targeting assignments in real time based on the inevitable realities of the dynamic situation on the beaches.
The War Diary notes that "Japanese resistance is now confined to the northeast tip of the island where a row of strongly built blockhouses is offering a stiff obstacle."
The Air Coordinator called on the 10 Hellcats of VF-23's Combat Air Patrol "to strafe trenches, foxholes and pill-boxes in areas 543 and 544."
The Action Report discussed the mechanics of strafing:
VF Strafing:
Opened fire - 3000'
Dive Angle - 30˚/60˚, Speed - 250 knots (average)
Pullout: 500'
It has been noted that pilots should maintain a steep angle in strafing dives to prevent damage to planes ahead from ricochets.
If the target is a pillbox, blockhouse or other covered installation, where it is essential that angle of firing be shallow to effect desired damage, planes should strafe individually. With proper spacing between places, the danger of ricochets from shallow dives can be eliminated."
The importance of proper target identification is reiterated:
"Of prime importance in direct support operations is that pilots first examine front lines and designated objective from a low altitude and then climb to a higher altitude and make strafing runs. This will reduce the possibility of hitting own troops."
Left uncommented on is the fact that low altitude passes over enemy forces will also increase the possibility of the aircraft getting hit by hostile fire.
The pace of operations was placing demands not only on the men, but on the machines as well:
At 1007 1 Hellcat declared an emergency and returned with a hydraulic leak.
"At 1555 VT-7 from this vessel, while on duty at Air Coordinator, experienced low manifold pressure that prohibited making carrier landing. Plane was water landed in the lagoon at Eniwetok Atoll and the pilot and crew members were reported rescued by the USS HAZELWOOD."
While the Air Group was involved in combat operations 50 miles to the south, all ships of the Task Group were ordered by the O.T.C. to "half-mast colors during burial services" aboard Princeton's Independence Class sister ship USS Langley from 1645 to 1655.
By the end of the day, Air Group 23 fliers would deliver 132 100-pound bombs, 32 fragmentation cluster bombs and fire 4550 .50 caliber rounds at increasingly deteriorating, but stubborn, enemy resistance on Eniwetok and Parry Islands.
Tomorrow, combat on Eniwetok Island would continue.
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