10 FEB 44
February 10th found Princeton in familiar waters on "station approximately 50 miles from Eniwetok Atoll to continue airstrikes."
The first strike aircraft to return reported "No evidence of any attempts at repair of runway since last strike by this Task Group on 6 February."
Of note, Air Group pilots did report sighting "The USS SEARAVEN fifteen miles north of Engebi Island, acting as 'life-guard' submarine."
It can be argued that Western countries value individual human lives to a larger degree than many other cultures and America, especially when sending her citizens in harms way, has historically devoted much collective national treasure to preserving same. An additional argument can be made that men will fight more willingly with the knowledge that their country will do its utmost to ensure their survival.
Searaven's tenth war patrol, from 17 January to 3 March, 1944, was occupied by photographic reconnaissance of Eniwetok Atoll and lifeguard duty for the air strikes on the Marshall Islands, Mariana Islands, and Truk. She was involved in two friendly fire incidents during the patrol. While she was on the surface near Engebi Island on 13 February, she sighted four U.S. Navy planes she mistook for Japanese aircraft and crash-dived. The planes mistook her for a Japanese submarine, and attacked her as she submerged. Searaven′s crew heard four depth charges detonate by the time she passed a depth of80 feet (24m). Off Eniwetok on 17 February, she submerged in accordance with instructions when she sighted an approaching U.S. Navy task force of battleships and destroyers, As the task force passed over her while she was at a depth of 200 feet (61m), one of the destroyers dropped a depth charge targeting her. She suffered no damage or casualties in either incident. She rescued three airmen during her patrol, but
On this day Air Group 23 flew 3 strikes totaling 54 flights while delivering 26,000 pounds of bombs on targets at Engebi and reporting that all assigned targets hit. Very little opposition was observed.
Despite this apparently solid performance, Rear Admiral Ginder didn't seem too pleased. At 1705 he sent a message to the Task Group directing "that bombing accuracy must be improved" and that "the high percentage of bombs failing to release must cease." He directed that "after each flight report number bombs failing to release and reasons. I attribute these failures 75% to aviation ordnance personnel and 25% to pilots." (To which Junior Officer Oesterle would have muttered something about the Admiral pulling numbers out of his ass, but I digress).
Anyway, accountability is never a bad thing.
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