18 JAN 44
19 JAN 44
Repair work on Princeton continues, and with an added sense of urgency because Captain Henderson and his staff have received “a secret despatch from Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet."*
At approximately 1100 various ships that would constitute Task Group 58.4 began to get underway. At 1131, the Princeton War Diary notes witnessing U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS getting underway. Indianapolis would experience one of the most tragic and horrifying episodes in all of naval history 18 months from this day. https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/ships/modern-ships/indianapolis.html
The Navy Yard Industrial Department indicated that superstructure repair work would not be completed until 1200 and Princeton would be unable to meet the sailing schedule. Task Group 58.4 Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), Rear Admiral Samuel P. Ginder, in U.S.S. Saratoga, “granted permission verbally” for Princeton to delay getting underway until noon.
The Navy Yard folks made things happen because at 1158 Princeton got “Underway from Berth B-21 to sortie from Pearl Harbor…to carry out operations against the enemy…” in accordance with “…Secret Operation Plan No. Pl-44.”
“At 1231 passed through the entrance net to Pearl Harbor and at 1247 left the swept channel and set course 180, speed 25 knots.”
Princeton watchstanders sighted Saratoga at 1307 and by 1400 had joined the Task Group in “Cruising Disposition 5L-O.” Cruising Disposition is “blackshoe** speak” for the formation or relative positioning each vessel will take while underway. There are a myriad of formations, almost all defensive in nature (anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine), available to the OTC for deploying his Task Group to counter what is the perceived dominant threat.
In the Naval Aviation world we more often than not fly as a two-plane “Section” or a four-plane “Division” both highly maneuverable and flexible formations. Of course there are times when we fly in much larger 12, 16, 20, 24 or even 28-plane formations. As you can imagine, the larger the formation, the more challenging and precise the planning and the briefing need to be. With this in mind…
“Task Group 58.4 is composed of Task Unit 58.4.5: U.S.S. SARATOGA, U.S.S. LANGLEY, and U.S.S. PRINCETON.; Task Unit 58.4.1: U.S.S.BOSTON, U.S.S. BALTIMORE, and U.S.S. SAN JUAN; Task Unit 58.4.4: U.S.S. MAURY, U.S.S. CRAVEN, U.S.S. GRIDLEY, U.S.S. McCALL, U.S.S. DUNLAP, U.S.S. FANNING, U.S.S. CASE, U.S.S. CUMMINGS; and Task Unit 58.4.6: U.S.S. TAPPAHANNOCK, U.S.S. NECHES, and U.S.S. U.S.S. MARTIN.”
Initially U.S.S. TAPPAHANNOCK was designated at “Fleet Guide” and as such was located in the center of the formation, the remaining ships using her as the reference for their positioning.
Princeton’s log: “U.S.S. PRINCETON’s station is 2120, with guide bearing 180˚, distant 2000 yards.”
Now, I lay absolutely zero claim to any knowledge of “shoe” stuff but I did perk up a bit when I saw that the “P” was only 2,000 yards from the guide. One mile may seem like a lot, but if you think about being in amongst and surrounded by 16 other ships, all of whom are potential collision threats, it seems kind of busy to me, even though we used to jest sarcastically about exactly how demanding is it really, when your job requires a "25 knot brain." (a typical head-on air-to-air intercept involves closure rates of 1,000+ knots)
Below is an example of a Task Group formation during a Naval exercise “war game” in 1940. Imagine trying to coordinate the movement of all or some of these ships on a beautiful, cloudless day with great visibility for signaling and radios that are clear and pristine.
Then imagine doing the same in stormy seas and reduced visibility.
Using only signal blinkers and semaphores for communications because the enemy could be listening.
At night.
While under attack.
I talked to Dad often about this time in his life. I’m sad that I never asked him how he felt on this particular day, as Princeton got underway bound for actual hostilities. Whether he would have acknowledged it or not, I have to think things were getting real for him, and for the Officers and men of “The Peerless P.”
* Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.
** Naval Aviators wear brown shoes, which are awesome. Surface Warfare Officers wear black shoes, which are ugly and gross. Aviators call Surface Warfare Officers “shoes,” and the shoes don’t always take the nickname in the good humor with which it is intended.
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